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Abstract.
Medical device interoperability has been identified as a key way of decreasing healthcare
costs while improving patient care [1]. This has lead to a shift towards placing more
medical devices onto IT networks. However, placing medical devices onto an IT network
may lead to additional risks to the safety, effectiveness and security. IEC 80001-1
addresses the roles, responsibilities and activities that need to be carried out when
managing these risks. In this article, we describe an exercise undertaken to assess a
Clinical Information Systems level of compliance with the IEC 80001-1 standard using an
assessment framework developed by the Regulated Software Research Centre (RSRC).
The purpose of this exercise was, to test and inform the development of an assessment
method which is part of the assessment framework for this standard, and also, to identify
how the management of such an existing Clinical Information Systems (CIS) project meets
the requirements of IEC 80001-1.
Introduction.
CISs are computer-based systems which collect, store, process and present the clinical
information required to deliver patient care. They assist clinical staff in delivering an
evidence based quality improvement process. We assessed the risk management
processes used in the management of a CIS implemented in a 40 bed critical care unit in
St James’s Hospital in Dublin, Ireland. This system is well regarded in Ireland as a good
example of how to structure and implement a CIS. It is robust and in the ten years it has
been running, there has been very little downtime or harm associated with its use.
To the casual observer it may appear as if the purpose of the CIS is to integrate data from
the physiological monitors, ventilators, dialysis devices etc. into the critical care electronic
patient record. It is true that the electro-medical devices at the bedside are interfaced, as
are other systems such as Laboratory and the Radiology Information Systems. On closer
examination it becomes clear that the computer at the bedside is also used to prescribe
and document delivered medications, and is the repository of the medical and nursing
notes. The system allows the doctors and nurses to combine information from different
sources into one system, develop and implement bespoke screen configurations, calculate
indices, and structure care plans.
The primary aim of the CIS project was to deliver an evidence based and on-going clinical
transformation programme. The project is clinically led and under the governance of the
Director of ICU. It would be a mistake to think of CIS as a technology system which in itself
brings benefits. As much consideration and planning was put into the processes which
would govern the use of the system and the quality cycle it would support, as the
technology itself.
The CIS is a socio-technical system consisting of people, processes and technology that
together deliver a care process that is standardised, measurable and operates within a
quality cycle. In assessing the risk management processes employed in managing such a
system, we need to not only look at the technical components but also the organizational
and social issues surrounding the use of these systems.
Risk management of clinical information systems that are built of Medical IT
networks.
A CIS brings many benefits however it also brings challenges, many of which are new for
hospitals to deal with. As the clinical care process is predicated on the availability of the
CIS, the reliability of the system as a whole needs to be assured. Therefore hospital
networks, which form part of the CIS infrastructure, become as important to the delivery of
patient care as the ventilators at the bedside. Any network outage can have an immediate
impact on that care.
Medical devices are stringently regulated prior to being placed on the market, and
standards exist to guide those who manufacture and regulate these devices [1]. Similarly
standards exist to guide those who implement and manage information technology
systems [2]. However, in implementing a CIS a hospital will inevitably place a medical
device onto an IT network and this may result in the device not behaving as intended and
having unanticipated consequences for the safety, effectiveness and security of the
network. To ensure that these consequences do not occur, a proactive risk management
approach, involving all risk management stakeholders, is required throughout the lifecycle
of the CIS and this approach needs to be informed by both good practice in Medical
Device and IT System design and management.
IEC 80001-1 (2010) [3] is a standard that details the roles, responsibilities and activities
required to manage the risk of placing a medical device on an IT network. It defines a
Medical IT Network as an IT Network that incorporates at least one Medical Device.
Conformance with the standard requires the hospital to take ownership of risk
management of a Medical IT Network. It also required the hospital to appoint and resource
a Medical IT Network Risk Manager who shall be responsible for the management and /or
execution of the risk management process used to maintain the safety and effectiveness
of the Medical IT-Network. This person should report to the Top Management and manage
both internal and external communications. All stakeholders should be partners in
ensuring the safety, effectiveness and security of the Medical IT Network and there should
be a shared vision between them all. No method currently exists to allow hospitals to be
assessed against the requirements of IEC 80001-1 standard.
Risk management of the clinical information systems in St James’s Hospital.
The governance and processes used to implement and manage the CIS in St. James’s
were put in place in 2003 prior to the publication of IEC 80001-1. They have evolved over
time in response to both the expansion of the system and the need to deal with difficulties
as they arose.
The system is under the governance of the Director of ICU and managed by a
multidisciplinary team (MDT). The MDT consists of doctors, nurses, pharmacists,
laboratory scientists, IT and Clinical Engineers. A multidisciplinary care team is defined as
“a group of health care workers who are members of different disciplines, each providing
specific services to the patient” [4] and this accurately describes the activity. The only full
time members of the MDT are two nurses who act as custodians of the
configuration/application and provide on-going training, user support and system
administration. The remainder of the team are drawn from their respective departments.
The MDT is convened by the Director of ICU. Like other clinical care teams, it has a strong
bias towards action with contributing staff involved in problem solving and service delivery.
The MDT culture is strongly non-hierarchical, with staff from different backgrounds
contributing to the scientific, managerial, and technical tasks, matching the skills available
to the tasks in hand at any given time.
The CIS MDT has a role in performing risk management over the life of the system. The
risk management programme is concerned with all aspects of the use of the system, not
just those associated with the Medical IT Network upon which the system is built. It meets
regularly to try and imaginatively foresee potential hazards and take steps to eliminate
them as part of the on-going system design. Contingency plans are put in place to cover
system failures that might occur for unforeseen reasons. Policies regarding user access,
use of passwords, automatic log off, user roles etc. are strictly enforced and the usual
protection from malware attack is implemented. The MDT also manages the change
control required over the life of the CIS.
Methodology.
The authors from the Regulated Software Research Centre (RSRC) team developed an
assessment framework which was based not only on the IEC 80001-1 standard but also
the other standards which informed it [5-11]. The resultant framework can be used to
assess the performance of risk management activities through-out the lifecycle of a
Medical IT Network. This framework includes a Process Reference Model (PRM), a
Process Assessment Model (PAM) and an assessment method. In order to perform an
assessment , an interview based upon a set of scripted questions was conducted for each
process area. On the basis of the responses to these questions, a capability level can be
assigned to each process. This allows strengths and weaknesses in current risk
management processes to be identified and recommendations to be provided for actions
to be implemented in order to improve the current risk management processes.
The evaluation was conducted over a three month period and took the form of a series of
meetings structured as an assessment. While the assessment method facilitates self-
assessment, in this instance the RSRC team who developed the framework undertook the
role of assessors. Where there were difficulties in understanding or interpretation, both the
RSRC and Hospital groups suspended the assessment process and worked together to
clarify the issues. In this way the governance and management of the CIS was assessed,
the assessment method was refined, and the questions which will be used during future
assessments were also tailored to improve their suitability.
Results and Discussion.
In this paper we discuss our experiences in using the first draft of a proposed assessment
method. On its own the PAM was difficult in interpret for those whose work practices are
routed in hospital culture and based on Healthcare Technology Management [12]. The
assessment exercise was very informative both for the hospital and research teams. Using
the PAM as a basis for the assessment forced the hospital team to familiarise themselves
with practices common in industry and in turn learn from and, adapt these approaches to
the hospital environment.
Working closely with the hospital team also allowed the RSRC team to identify and
understand the Clinical Engineering team’s particular role as risk management
stakeholders and how risk management is currently performed when placing a medical
device onto the network, within the hospital culture.
The approach used is based on the concept of the Process Assessment Model used to
facilitate process improvement in industry. Consequently the terminology adopted was at
times unfamiliar to hospital staff. This highlighted the need for more work to be performed
to frame the questions in such a way as take cognisance of the hospital practice and
culture.
By far the greatest deficit of the hospital risk management process identified by the
process assessment model was the lack of adequate documentation. Analysis revealed
this was due to lack of protected resources assigned within the hospital to implement CIS
projects. Where staff were assigned to the project full time (the application and support
nursing staff) the documentation was better. However, members of the MDT who have
primary roles in their own departments and contribute to the CIS management on a part-
time basis rarely have time to document the risk management activities associated with
the support of the CIS. This is not to say that the risk management processes are not
being followed, often excellent processes were in place; however they were often based
on an individual’s enthusiasm and acumen and not documented within an agreed system.
The Medical IT Network risk management was being undertaken within a wider CIS
system risk management process. This wider process rightly prioritises elimination of
hazards that might impact on patient care. When it came to assessing hazards associated
with the Medical IT Network the same focus on the impact to patient care was evident. The
probability of occurrence of potential hazards to the Medical IT Network was usually low
compared to other hazards and often impossible for hospital staff to estimate.
IEC 80001-1 describes specific roles prescribed to individuals such as the Medical IT
Network Risk Manager. We found that in a number of cases the attributes being assessed
were all in place but responsibility and resources distributed among a number of
individuals who were part of the MDT. This made assessment difficult, although after
detailed discussion it usually emerged that the processes being assessed were in place,
but in a different way from that expected by the authors of the PAM. We found that during
the planning and commissioning phase, the role of Medical IT Network Risk Manager as
described in the standard was undertaken by the lead Clinical Engineer who acted as
project manager for the implementation phase. Where major upgrades to the system were
being undertaken, or the system expanded, this individual again assumed a project
manager role. Being an experienced Clinical Engineer this individual was perfectly placed
to understand both the clinical and technical challenges that come with such a system.
They acted not only as project manager but also as the synergist between the different
professional groups contributing to the project (medical, nursing, ICT, finance and
procurement) and also the system and medical device vendors. In doing so, they fostered
the shared vision between all the stakeholders which is one of the requirements of IEC
80001-1. Within the procurement documentation, there was clearly evidence that detailed
consideration had been given to risk management of the Medical IT Network. However,
the risk management process associated with the on-going development of the application
as part of the MDT quality cycle was undertaken by one of the two full time nursing staff
assigned to the project. This Lead Informatics Nurse had risk management of the
application named in her job description, and risk management was a recurring agenda
item for the MDT which meets every two weeks. The assessment identified a weakness in
how the risk management of the Medical IT Network is managed on an on-going basis.
The management of the computers in the unit and the network was shared between the
clinical engineering group and the ICT department but there was little clarity around this.
Often the risk management associated with these elements happened within different
departments and consequently was not supported by a single overarching policy.
The standard also highlights the need for clear responsibility agreements to be put in place
between the hospital and the vendors who are contracted to supply or support the CIS
system. These were in place as a result of the application of standard Healthcare
Technology Management practice and took the form of service contracts. The contract
with the main system supplier included provision for the company representative to
participate as required in the CIS MDT in the provision of advice regarding change control
and on-going application and risk management support. Again this highlighted how the
management fostered the development of a shared vision between all stakeholders.
Although outside of the scope of IEC 80001-1, the review of compliance with the
responsibility agreements prompted a review of the need for internal Memorandums of
Understanding between different departments who contribute to the CIS project. We found
that there was a need to formalise the arrangements between different departments within
the hospital who contributed to the MDT. Often the activity and responsibility was more
closely associated with the individual rather than the department they represented and this
posed challenges when staff members changed their role or left the organisation.
The success of the MDT in implementing good risk management processes has resulted
in a system which is useful and robust. This has been achieved as a result of committed
individuals who have worked well together to deliver the socio-technical system. This
success masks the need for the institution to invest in a necessary resource to build,
maintain and document the risk management process which such systems clearly require.
The standard rightly identifies a role for Top Management in establishing the governance
and structures to support this. However, the drivers for these systems are more often than
not clinical and they tend to evolve and grow out of practice at the unit level. To that
extent, they develop bottom up, rather than top down. The assessment helped us to
identify this. The fact that the Director of ICU is responsible for risk management of the
Medical IT Network, which is part of the wider hospital network, highlights that in hospitals
the necessary changes in governance structures tends to lag behind the development of
novel technologies and systems.
Following the assessment a number of improvements have been implemented. The
Clinical Engineering and ICT groups have completed a shared mapping exercise to clearly
identify all technical components of the network and describe how the network is
configured. The MDT held formal meetings with that system supplier to review the
responsibility agreements and also share information pertinent to risk management
processes. In general the risk management of the system is given a higher priority at MDT
meeting and processes associated with change control have been reviewed and
improved.
Conclusions
IEC 80001-1 is valuable to hospitals. It set out the people and processes that need to be
in place for a hospital to undertake risk management of Medical IT Networks. It provides a
framework for discussion between those who are advocates for risk management of
Medical IT Networks and Top Management. However, at first reading the specific
provisions detailed in the standard may be difficult to map onto existing hospital structures.
The assessment helped the hospital to identify and protect strengths in the current risk
management processes and to identify opportunities for improvement and implement
these improvements.
The interaction between the RSRC and Hospital teams allowed the questions used in the
assessment method to be rephrased in a way that acknowledged the existing hospital
processes and culture, and this work is on-going.
The MDT provides an excellent forum within which the risk management activities can be
undertaken. This works best during project phases where the members concentrate on
achieving a particular milestone and there is a clear project manager who assumes the
role of Medical IT Network Risk Manager. The assessment highlighted that on-going risk
management of the Medical IT Network could be improved but this would require more
resources to deliver this as part of an on-going process, not just during go live to upgrade
projects.
Since compliance with IEC 80001-1 is measured by inspection of the documentation the
hospital has in place, it is clear that for hospitals to become compliant, they will have to
change how they support such systems to allow for the complete risk management
process to be put in place and documented.
To meet both of the objectives set out above, those developing CIS systems in a bottom
up fashion and in response to clinical need, will need to act as advocates with top
management for the necessary resources to adequately manage these systems. This is
particularly so as the complexity and prevalence of Clinical Information Systems increases.
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